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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-WHETHER A DEFENDANT ACCUSED OF
A FELONY MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY WAIVE AND CONSENT TO PROSECUTION
ON INFORMATION-The validity of a basic statutory change in the field
of criminal procedure was involved in the recent case entitled State v.
Centers' on hearing before an Ohio Court of Common Pleas. The def end-
ant therein, charged with the felony of operating a motor vehicle without
the owner's consent, had originally waived presentment to the grand jury
in the manner purportedly authorized by a recent addition to the Ohio
Revised Code.2 After the filing of an information in lieu of an indict-
ment, the defendant then moved to dismiss the prosecution on the premise
that the statute in question was invalid in the face of a constitutional
requirement to the effect that no person should be held to answer for a
capital offense, or otherwise infamous crime, except on the presentment
or indictment of a grand jury.3 The motion was sustained when the trial
judge reached the conclusion that the statute was invalid because the
state constitution dictated the only method available for the prosecution
of felonies.
The Ohio court, in reaching this result, relied on the New York case,
People ex rel Battista v. Christian.4 The New York court decided that
the return of a grand jury indictment is a jurisdictional prerequisite
which cannot be waived. This was based on the New York constitution,
which contained wording similar to that of the Ohio constitutional provi-
sion. The New York court analogized the waiver of a grand jury to the
waiver of a petit jury, stating that there is a mandatory public policy
involved in these constitutional safeguards.5
In 19-55 the Illinois legislature amended its criminal code to allow
waiver of indictment in certain felony prosecutions.6 The constitutionality
1162 N. E. (2d) 925 (Ohio Com. Pleas, 1959).
2 Ohio Rev. Code § 2941.021, enacted in 1959, states that: "Any criminal offense
which is not punishable by death or life imprisonment may be prosecuted by in-
formation filed in common pleas court by the prosecuting attorney if the defendant
after he has been advised by the court of the nature of the charge against him and
of his rights under the constitution, is represented by counsel or has affirmatively
waived counsel by waiver in writing and in open court, waives in writing and in
open court prosecution by indictment."
3 Ohio Const. 1851, Art. I, § 10.
4 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E. 111 (1928).
5 The court cited Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128 (1858) holding that a petit jury
could not constitutionally be waived.
6 Il. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 702, states: "All offenses cognizable in the
said courts shall be prosecuted by indictment or, except for crimes of treason,
murder or manslaughter, by information if the defendant after he has been advised
of the nature of the charges and of his rights, waives In open court prosecution by
indictment. The prosecution of a felony under an information shall be conducted
In accordance with the statutory requirements of proceedings under an indictment."
This amendment has been supplemented by Rule 26 of the Illinois Supreme Court.
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of that amendment was upheld in People v. Bradley.7 The court spe-
cifically rejected the reasoning of the New York court in the Battista case'
and alluded to the federal and state cases that uphold the constitutionality
of waiver of indictment.9 The Illinois constitutional language is similar
to that of the constitutions mentioned but adds a proviso giving the legisla-
ture authority to abolish the grand jury altogether. 10 This proviso forti-
fies the Illinois Court's position for it indicates that any policy considera-
tions concerning the waiver of the indictment requirement may be made
by the legislature. It has been suggested, therefore, that "the power to
abolish completely included the power to do something less.""
Contrary to this Illinois view, the New York and Ohio courts start
with the major premise that a right cannot be waived if public injury may
result and conclude that a waiver of indictment cannot validly be made.
These courts do not explain the minor premise, namely, the nature of
the alleged public injury. These courts also do not state their bases or
standards that the right to accusation by a grand jury is "fundamental"
or "jurisdictional." Authority for the statement that indictment is a
jurisdictional prerequisite is found in two early federal cases.' 2  But
those cases did not deal with the waiver question here involved. The
present federal position is that voluntary waiver in a court of the United
States does not violate rights conferred by the federal constitution.
1 3 It
was early decided that the federal indictment provision conferred no rights
on defendants before state tribunals.'
4
It has been stated by an Ohio court that "the primary function of
an indictment is to inform the accused of the offense with which he is
77 111. (2d) 619, 131 N. E. (2d) 538 (1956).
8 Id. at p. 623 the court said: "The Battista case speaks of 'public injury' which
would result from permitting waiver of indictment. But it is hard to see how the
public can be injured by allowing an individual to state that he neither needs nor
desires the protection of a formal action by the grand jury in a particular pro-
ceeding."
9 Id. at p. 624.
10 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 8: "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense, unless on indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punish-
ment is by fine, or Imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of
impeachment, and in cases arising in the army and navy, or in the militia when in
actual service in time of war or public danger: Provided, that the grand jury may
be abolished by law in all cases."
11 34 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEmV 255, 256.
12 Ex Parte Baine, 121 U. S. 1, 11 S. Ct. 871, 30 L. Ed. 849 (1886), Ex Parte
McCluskey, 40 F. 71 (1889).
Is Fed. Rules Crim. Pro., Rule 7(b) : "An offense which may be punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor may be prosecuted
by information if the defendant after he has been advised of the nature of the
charges and his rights, waives in open court prosecution by indictment." This rule
was upheld in Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. (2d) 592 (1947).
14 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L Ed. 232 (1884).
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charged so that he may prepare for trial. "'1 This end could just as
properly be fulfilled by the use of an information. Under a waiver provi-
sion the accused is given a new privilege without depriving him of any
right. By waiving indictment, the accused has the benefit of a trial un-
hampered by undue delay and the taxpayers have the benefit of a less
costly and less cumbersome accusatory procedure.
J. H. ALESIA
INJUNCTION - PRELIMINARY AND INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS -
WHETHER A FAILURE TO SEASONABLY RAISE A STATUTORY OBJECTION TO
THE ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BARS AN AwARD OF DAMAGES
ON 'THE SUBSEQUENT DISSOLUTION OF THE INJUNCTIoN-Further illumina-
tion of the right of a defendant against whom an injunction has been
wrongfully issued to receive an award of damages has been provided in
the recent case of Presbyterian Distribution Service v. Chicago National
Bank.' The case arose with the entry of a judgment by confession in favor
of the defendant and against the plaintiff herein. Upon notice and hear-
ing in the trial court, a preliminary injunction was issued in favor of
the plaintiff which restrained the defendant from enforcing the judgment.
At that time, the defendant failed to object even though the bond required
by statute was not posted.2 Shortly thereafter, the defendant successfully
moved to vacate the order granting the injunction on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to post the mandatory bond and, at this suggestion,
was awarded damages by the trial court.3 The Appellate Court for the
First District of Illinois reversed the award since the defendant neglected
to interpose an objection which, in all probability, would have been suc-
cessful and thus prevented the ensuing damage.
The Illinois General Assembly has heretofore enacted two statutes
inaugurating the right to an award of damages upon the dissolution of a
wrongfully issued preliminary injunction. The first measure was enacted
15 State v. Roche, 135 N. E. (2d) 789 (Ohio App., 1955).
121 Ill. App. (2d) 188, 157 N. H. (2d) 789 (1959).
2 Il. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 8, provides that prior to the issuance of an
injunction restraining the enforcement of a judgment the plaintiff must post a bond
in double the amount of the judgment and costs, plus an additional amount to
cover any damages that may be awarded in the event the injunction is dissolved.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 12, which, in effect, provides that where a
preliminary injunction is dissolved, the successful party may be awarded any dam-
ages sustained while the injunction was in force.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 8, which, in effect, provides that upon the dis-
solution of an injunction issued to restrain the enforcement of a judgment the
plaintiff can be assessed damages not to exceed ten per cent of the monetary value
of the judgment released, exclusive of interest and costs.
